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Most economic analysis of inequality, theoretical and empirical, rely on the assumption that
equality of individual outcomes (e.g. welfare, income, health) is per se a desirable social objec-
tive. This is sometimes criticized for standing at odd with both public perceptions of inequalities
and some developments in modern theories of justice. According to this criticism, a distinc-
tion must be drawn between morally or socially justi￿ed and unjusti￿ed inequalities. This has
led egalitarian philosophers such as Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981a; 1981b), Sen (1985), Cohen
(1989) or Arneson (1989; 1990) to claim that distributive justice does not entail the equality
of individual outcomes but only requires that individuals face equal opportunities for outcome.
Despite the growing political audience of this view, few economic analysis have tried to assess
the extent to which equality of opportunity is empirically satis￿ed. 1 Two major issues are likely
to account for this state of a￿airs. First, how should equality of opportunity be characterized?
In fact, no consensus has been reached, neither in the philosophical nor in the public debates, re-
garding how opportunities should be de￿ned and in what sense they should be considered equal.
In this paper we o￿er a model of equality of opportunity that encompasses several conceptions
expressed in these debates. Second, how can equality of opportunity be empirically assessed ?
This requires that the determinants of individual outcomes be taken into account. However,
these determinants are never fully observable. Hence, we analyze how the various conceptions
can be empirically identi￿ed, given data limitations, and provide testable conditions for equality
of opportunity. Lastly, we develop an empirical implementation of these conditions and examine
the extent to which equality of opportunity is achieved in the distribution of income in France.
One important implication of the equal-opportunity view is that judgements about equality
must take into account the determinants of individual outcomes. At least two sets of factors
must be distinguished : on the one hand, factors that re￿ect individual responsible choices
and are considered a legitimate source of inequality; on the other hand, factors beyond the
realm of individual responsibility and that do not appear as socially or morally acceptable
sources of inequality. Following the terminology introduced in Roemer (1998), we refer to
the former determinants as e￿ort and to the latter as circumstances. As most authors would
agree, the principle of equality of opportunity essentially requires, that, given individual e￿ort,
circumstances do not a￿ect individual prospects for outcome, or to paraphrase Rawls (1971,
p.63), that individual with similar e￿ort face ￿ the same prospects of success regardless of their
1Roemer et al. (2003), O’Neill et al. (1999), Checchi et al. (1999), Benabou and Ok (2001), Bourguignon
et al. (2003), Goux and Maurin (2003), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Checchi and Peragine (2005) who
analyze equality of opportunity for income and Schuetz et al. (2005) who examine educational opportunities are
some of the exceptions.
1initial place in the social system ￿. However, there remains considerable discussion regarding
what factors should count as e￿ort or circumstances.
A prominent view in these debates is the one expressed by John Roemer in a series of con-
tributions.2 3 It claims that the de￿nition of circumstances is a matter of political choice.
Furthermore, once circumstances have been de￿ned ￿ by society￿4, remaining di￿erences in in-
dividual outcomes should be considered the result of e￿ort. Hence, the distinction between
circumstances and e￿ort turns into a dichotomic partitioning of the determinants of outcome.
As a consequence, requiring that, for a given level of e￿ort, circumstances do not a￿ect in-
dividual prospects for outcome, implies that individuals with similar e￿ort should have equal
outcomes.
This dichotomic approach lies at the heart of most economic analysis of equality of oppor-
tunity. However, it does not fully account for the diversity of the determinants of outcome
and leads to a speci￿c conception of equality of opportunity. Assuming that society has agreed
on a given set of circumstances does not imply that the remaining determinants will re￿ect
individual responsible choice and should be treated as e￿ort. In this respect, international atti-
tudes surveys, such as the one summarized in Figure 1, reveal two noteworthy di￿erences across
countries. First, countries di￿er in their propensity to consider that bad economic outcomes
re￿ect social injustice, which indicates that the de￿nition of circumstances may vary across
societies. Second, if we are willing to identify ￿social injustice￿ with circumstances de￿ned ￿by
society￿, the ￿gure also suggests that countries di￿er in their belief in the role of e￿ort in shaping
individual outcomes, over and beyond the in￿uence of circumstances. 5 The assumption that
the determinants of outcomes excluded from socially de￿ned circumstances relate to individual
e￿ort provides a good approximation of US average beliefs. It does not however correspond to
the social perception in many European countries, which emphasizes the role of luck in shaping
individual success. Our purpose is to build a model of equality of opportunity ￿exible enough to
encompass this diversity of perceptions. This requires to distinguish three generic determinants
of individual outcomes : circumstances, e￿ort and luck.
But how can luck be accounted for in the de￿nition of equality of opportunity ? The
extent to which the impact of non-responsibility factors should be compensated has been amply
discussed in the philosophical literature. According to these debates, distributive justice requires
2For a theoretical discussion, see Roemer (1993; 1998) and for empirical applications Betts and Roemer
(1999), Roemer et al. (2003) and Dardanoni et al. (2005).
3See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2007) for a thorough discussion of alternative perspectives and related issues.
4Roemer (1993, p.149)
5For more detailed evidence, see among others Marshall et al. (1999), Corneo and Gruner (2002) and Alesina
and Angeletos (2005).
2Figure 1: Beliefs in the role of luck, e￿ort and social injustice in bad economic outcomes
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Source : World Values Survey (1990). Answers to the question : " Why are there people living in need ? ".
Authors’ computations excluding the following answers : It is an inevitable part of modern progress; None of
theses; Don’t know.
that factors akin to circumstances, such as family and social background, do not lead, other
things equal, to di￿erences in outcome, and be compensated. However, owing to di￿erent moral
demands, justice does not necessarily require that the impact of all non-responsibility factors
be nulli￿ed. In some cases, luck may appear as a fair source of inequality provided that it is
even-handed. Equality of opportunity does not entail that individual with similar e￿ort reach
equal outcomes. What equality of opportunity requires is that, given e￿ort, no one face more
favorable outcome prospects, as a result of luck, for reasons related to di￿erential circumstances.
The ￿rst contribution of this paper is to o￿er a characterization of equality of opportunity
consistent with this view. Given e￿ort, the outcome prospects of an individual are summarized
by the outcome distribution conditional on her circumstances. Our characterization rests on
the idea that equality of opportunity prevails when individuals are indi￿erent between the
distributions attached to all possible circumstances. To compare these distributions, we resort
to the tools of stochastic dominance (￿rst and second order) whose appeal is to encompass a
wide range of preferences for uncertain outcomes. This leads us to distinguish two situations of
interest, from the point of view of equality of opportunity. The ￿rst situation, which corresponds
to a strict form of equality of opportunity, arises when the outcome distributions conditional on
e￿ort are equal. The second situation, which we refer to as weak equality of opportunity, arises
when the outcome distributions conditional on e￿ort cannot be ranked using ￿rst and second
order stochastic dominance criteria : this corresponds to absence of unanimous preferences over
3the range of possible circumstances.
The empirical implementation of these de￿nitions of equality of opportunity would be
straightforward if circumstances and e￿ort were observable. However, in practice, this con-
dition may not be easily met. The empirical assessment of equality of opportunity requires
considerable information on the determinants of individual outcomes. And this information
is not entirely available in existing data sets. 6 In most cases, not all the relevant aspects of
individual e￿ort can measured and only a subset of the relevant circumstances can be observ-
able. We discuss the consequences of these data limitations for the evaluation of equality of
opportunity. The second contribution of the paper is to show that, conditional on further distri-
butional assumptions, it is still possible in some cases to provide testable conditions for equality
of opportunity when e￿ort and circumstances are not fully observed.
We then develop an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity for income acquisition in
France, using household surveys over the period 1979-2000. In this application, we assume that
circumstances are de￿ned by individual social background, measured by father’s occupation
and we compare income distributions conditional on social origin. Our analysis of these income
distributions relies on non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance developed by Davidson and
Duclos (2000). When comparing income distributions conditional on social origin, our analysis
of equality of opportunity stands at the intersection of two strands of research on intergen-
erational mobility. First, a long tradition in sociology has analyzed the association between
social origin and destination, using matrices of mobility among discrete social classi￿cations. 7
Second a growing economic literature has recently focused on the correlation between parents’
and children’s income, concentrating on the mean impact of socio-economic origin on o￿spring’s
earnings.8 Together with the sociological tradition, we capture social origin by using a discrete
classi￿cation. However, we focus on o￿spring’s income rather than social class of destination,
a concern that is common to the economic analysis of intergenerational income mobility. Rel-
ative to this literature, one should emphasize that although we adopt a coarser description of
socio-economic origin, our analysis of the full distribution of o￿spring’s income allows for a rich
description of the transmission of socio-economic status.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our characterization of
equality of opportunity. We ￿rst review the various conceptions of equality of opportunity
that have been discussed in recent philosophical debates. We then develop a comprehensive
6In this respect, the imperfection of available data sets re￿ects a more fundamental informational constraint
in liberal democracies.
7See for instance Boudon (1974), Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) and Breen (2004).
8See for instance Bowles and Gintis (2002) and Solon (2002).
4model that accommodates these various conceptions and discuss the identi￿cation of equality
of opportunity when the relevant determinants of outcome are only partially observable. In
section 3, we develop an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity for income in France.
2 Equality of opportunity : de￿nitions and identi￿cation
2.1 Luck and equality of opportunity : a brief review
In the philosophical debates on equality of opportunity, the concept of luck refers to situations
where individual control, choice or moral responsibility bears no relationship to the occurrence
of outcomes.9 This broad concept includes the notions of circumstances and luck that we
previously referred to. The general idea, shared by many authors, is that inequalities related
to luck should be compensated, as they cannot be ascribed to personal responsibility. However,
according to some authors, this egalitarian requirement may con￿ict with other values that
should receive priority. This leads to distinguish several varieties of luck.
2.1.1 Varieties of luck
Luck clearly appears as a multi-faceted notion that comprises a variety of empirical phenomena.
Our goal is to draw attention to several ideal-type notions of luck that have been singled out
in the debate about equality of opportunity, as potentially calling for di￿erent correction. At
least four di￿erent concepts of luck have been discussed, which can be illustrated by simple
empirical examples. The four conceptions do not represent all possible concepts of luck nor are
they independent from each other. Distinguishing theses di￿erent types of luck seems useful for
discussing whether and how luck should be neutralized.
First, consider two equally talented and motivated individuals whose outcome di￿er only
because of di￿erences in their family’s social connections. In this situation individual actions
and their results are pre-determined by antecedent factors (family and social origin). This
illustrates the idea of social lottery developed by Rawls. Obviously, individuals have no control
or choice over these factors. It is most probably the ￿rst candidate to be considered as a
circumstance.10 We propose to call it social background luck.
Second, consider two fraternal twins whose outcome di￿er only because one of them genet-
ically inherited a special talent. As in the previous example, the determinant of di￿erential
success, talent, lies beyond the realm of individual choice or control. One important di￿erence
9See Lippert-Rasmussen (2005) for a discussion of the relationship between luck and distributive justice.
10See for instance the discussion in Dardanoni, Fields, Roemer and Sanchez Puerta (2005).
5with the previous form of luck is that a speci￿c individual talent can be seen as constitutive
of the individual, in the sense that it de￿nes what person she is. This second example illus-
trates the notion of constitutive luck, or Rawls’ idea of a natural lottery. It includes genetically
inherited factors and we therefore propose to call it genetic luck.
Third consider two individuals with similar talent and social background. Their outcomes
di￿er as a result of a lottery they could not escape. For instance, as a result of the Vietnam
draft lottery, one of them is inducted into the Army and subsequently enjoys poor outcomes,
but not the other. This is a special form of Dworkin’s notion of brute luck, which represents
a situation where the individual cannot reasonably impact the probability of an event taking
place. This kind of luck can occur at any time over a life course. Vallentyne (2002) distinguishes
two types of brute luck. Initial brute luck is de￿ned as the set of factors that in￿uence lifetime
prospects up to the moment when individuals can be considered responsible for their choices
and decisions. This roughly corresponds to Arneson (1990)’s idea of a ￿ canonical moment￿
where individuals become responsible for their choices and preferences. By contrast, later brute
luck denotes the luck factors that a￿ect individual outcomes after the canonical moment. Our
example illustrates later brute luck.
Fourth, consider two individuals who both have to choose among two lotteries. The outcome
of the ￿rst lottery is certain. The outcome of the second is random. Assume that individuals
make di￿erent choices and end up with di￿erent outcomes. The occurrence of outcomes partly
escapes individual control, although by making di￿erent choices, one can in￿uence the occur-
rence of outcomes. This corresponds to Dworkin’s notion of option luck. This notion implies
that risk is taken deliberately, is calculated, isolated, anticipated and avoidable. 11 We assume
it is the case in our example and refer to it as informed option luck.
2.1.2 The requisites of equality of opportunity
Whether (and how), from an egalitarian perspectives, these di￿erent varieties of luck ought to be
compensated has been the subject of numerous papers. Their main (unconsensual) conclusion
is that not all types of luck singled out in the previous paragraphs call for full compensation.
Almost all authors would agree that social background luck should be fully compensated,
resorting to the ‘starting gate position ’ argument : some deep inequalities of life prospects
related to economic and social circumstances of birth cannot be justi￿ed by appeal to merit and
11Lippert-Rasmussen (2001) and Fleurbaey (2001) emphasize the strong informational requirements that un-
derlie the notion of option luck : option luck presupposes that agents share similar subjective and objective
probabilities of outcome occurrence.
6desert (Rawls, 1971).12 By full compensation, we mean that justice requires that outcomes be
equal regardless of social background luck, other things being equal.
A similar argument applies to the e￿ects of genetic luck on individual outcomes. However,
given the constitutive nature of genetic luck, compensation of its impact may con￿ict with other
ethical values. Hence, it has been claimed that genetic luck should not be compensated, owing
to the libertarian principle of self-ownership which states that agents are entitled to the full
bene￿t of their natural personal endowments (e.g. intelligence, beauty, strength) (Nozick, 1977,
p.225). For some authors, this requirement should receive priority over other principles. 13 For
instance, Vallentyne (1997) claims that "there are several independent moral demands, that they
include both a demand for self-ownership and a demand for equality, and that a very strong form
of self-ownership [...] constrains the demands of equality ".
From a moral point of view, compensation for all forms of luck has also been contested on
e￿ciency grounds. The cost of compensating for all forms of luck can obviously be quite high.
Such compensation requires considerable (and costly) information on individual situations as
well as strong redistribution which may lead to large distortions. If theses costs are large enough,
compensating for all forms of luck may diminish the overall well-being. This has led some
authors to formulate a restricted requirement of justice, which only calls for the compensation of
initial brute luck and avoids part of the cost of redistribution. According to Vallentyne (2002),
justice only requires that the initial value of lifetime prospects be equal across individuals,
where the initial value is computed at the onset of adulthood. 14 This requires compensating for
initial brute luck. Of course, to the extent that later brute luck is related to initial brute luck,
compensation for the latter implies (at least partial) compensation for the former. However,
equalizing the value of initial lifetime prospects does not erase all the impact of later brute luck
on individual outcomes and individual can still end up, ex post, with di￿erent outcomes as a
result of brute luck. It simply makes sure that later brute luck is ex ante even-handed.
Lastly, three distinct views are held regarding the compensation for informed option luck.
To the extent that the risky outcomes of option luck are avoidable and result from individual
choice, some authors have claimed that inequalities resulting from option luck should not be
compensated, owing to the principle of natural reward which states that the consequences of
12See Swift (2005) for a discussion of the legitimacy of parental in￿uence on child’s outcomes.
13The idea that several moral value could constrain the principle of equality is acknowledged by numerous
authors. For instance, Cohen recognize that the egalitarian principle may con￿ict other value (for him individual
responsibility) : ￿ I take for granted that there is something that justice requires people to have equal amounts
of, not no matter what, but to whatever extent is allowed by values which compete with distributive equality ￿.
14According to Vallentyne, one advantage of this procedure is that the ex ante evaluation of life-time prospects
takes into account the cost redistribution. This construct is in many ways similar to the one developed by Arneson
(1989) who suggests that equality of opportunity should be de￿ned by the equality of ￿ preference satisfaction
expectations￿.
7individual choice should be maintained. Dworkin supports that idea. A second view, expressed
for instance in Vallentyne (2002), states that equity authorizes taxation of the results of good
option luck to partly compensate individuals who su￿ered bad option luck. Lastly, some authors,
including Fleurbaey (1995), recommend full compensation of the outcomes of option luck. Two
distinct arguments are given in favor of this proposal. First, these authors underscore the fact
that pure option luck is an extremely restrictive notion of luck that is both very rarely met in
practice and very di￿cult to assess empirically. Second, and more importantly, they stress that
not compensating for the e￿ect of option luck can imply that small errors of choices involve
disproportionate, and thus unfair, penalties for some individuals.
2.2 A model of equality of opportunity
The above section reveals the lack of agreement regarding how non-responsibility factors should
be accounted for in the de￿nition of equality of opportunity. However three main conclusions
emerge from this analysis. First, the idea that social background luck should be included in the
set of circumstances seems beyond dispute. Second, some non-responsibility factors could be
excluded from the set of circumstances. Third, those non-responsibility factors excluded from
the set of circumstances di￿er from individual e￿ort to the extent that they do not necessarily
relate to individual responsibility.
Our purpose is to build an economic model of equality of opportunity ￿exible enough to
accommodate the diversity of positions held in ethical debates. It seems clear from the above
discussion that this model should incorporate three types of factors : circumstances denote the
non-responsibility factors that are not considered a legitimate source of inequality; e￿ort denotes
the determinants of outcome that pertain to individual responsibility and that are consequently
seen as a legitimate source of inequality; luck denotes the non-responsibility factors that are
seen as a legitimate source of inequality as long as they a￿ect individual outcomes in a neutral
way, given circumstances and e￿ort. Our aim is to develop a characterization of equality of
opportunity consistent with this view and that lends itself to empirically testable conditions.
In this paper, we take a neutral stance on the question of what factors should count as
circumstances, e￿ort or luck, which, in our view, pertains to moral or political debates. Ethical
debates have emphasized the role of individual responsibility in de￿ning e￿ort. For this reason,
and for ease of exposition, we largely retain this perspective in our discussion. One should
however strongly emphasize that this perspective is in no way central to the analysis of this
paper. As the previous section shows, other ethical principles may serve to de￿ne e￿ort and to
8delineate the scope of legitimate inequalities. 15 The formal de￿nitions of equality of opportunity
provided below are also consistent with these alternative principles. We now start with a
simpli￿ed model where e￿ort is not considered, to emphasize our main concepts.
2.2.1 Circumstances and luck : a simpli￿ed model
De￿nition of equality of opportunity Consider the case where outcome is only determined
by non-responsibility factors. Let y denote individual outcome and c denote the vector of
circumstances. Let F() denote the cumulative distribution of outcome. Let a type de￿ne the set
of individuals with similar circumstances. We refer to the determinants of outcome not included
in c as luck. As will become clear, the factors included in luck only matter through their joint
e￿ect on outcome. More precisely, in this setting, the overall impact of luck can be measured
by the level of outcome that an individual reaches, for by de￿nition, lucky individuals are the
one who enjoy higher outcomes. And the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances,
F(y|c), measures how luck a￿ects the outcomes of individuals of a given type. In fact, this
distribution is precisely the distribution of opportunities for outcome o￿ered to individuals of
type c. It gives the odds of all possible outcomes that may ex ante occur for an individual
of this type, as a result of the in￿uence of luck. Alternatively, without loss of generality, luck
may be summarized by a scalar index l. In this case, let Y (c,l) denote the outcome function.
Again, by the very de￿nition of luck, this function must be strictly increasing in l. An example
of such an index l may be de￿ned by the rank where the individual sits in the distribution of
outcome conditional on her circumstances : l = F(y|c). So arbitrarily de￿ned, l measures the
relative degree of luck, within a given type. And Y (c,l) expresses the outcome as a function
of the individual circumstances and relative degree of luck. By construction, l is identically
distributed across types, which does not imply that a given degree of luck is associated with
similar outcomes regardless of circumstances.
Assume that the social planner’s objective is the following : circumstances per se should
not lead to unequal outcomes; luck can lead to di￿erences in individual outcomes as long as it
remains neutral with respect to circumstances. Equality of opportunity so de￿ned, is equivalent
to require that individuals face similar prospects of outcome y regardless of their circumstances
c. This leads to the following de￿nition of equality of opportunity.
Definition EOP 1
Equality of opportunity is satis￿ed i￿ : ∀(c,c0), F(|c) = F(|c0).
15For instance, the principle of self-ownership implies that some non-responsibility factors could be included
in e￿ort.
9This condition makes sure that there is no inequality related to individual circumstances
and that luck a￿ects outcome in a similar ways regardless of circumstances. Another way to
interpret this condition is to say that it requires individuals with the same degree of relative
luck l to have equal outcomes, regardless of c, i.e. Y (c,l) = Y (l) for all c.
One should also note that de￿nition EOP 1 does not place any restriction on the dispersion
of outcome resulting, within type, from the in￿uence of luck. One may further require that
these distributions be equal to a speci￿c income distribution Fα, whose shape, indexed by some
parameter α, captures the preferences of the social planner regarding the equalization of the
e￿ect of luck. For instance, as discussed in section 2.1, some authors argue that the impact of
option luck should be fully compensated. In this case, they would require that Fα be equal to
a point mass distribution F0 which is equivalent to require that all the factors that account for
luck be included among the set of circumstances. On the opposite, other authors call for non-
compensation of the e￿ect of option luck and would require that Fα be the ￿natural￿ distribution
of outcome resulting from option luck, say F1. Yet other authors, who take an intermediate
stance between each polar opinion, would demand partial compensation of the impact of option
luck and require that Fα be some intermediate distribution between F0 and F1. In that way,
our de￿nition of equality of opportunity is su￿ciently ￿exible to encompass various view points
about the neutralization of luck.
Even without placing any further restriction on the distribution of income, the situation
characterized by EOP 1 appears as a situation of strong equality of opportunity. This condition
is very stringent and may not easily be satis￿ed in practice. Consequently one may wonder
whether all situations where EOP 1 is violated should be considered equivalent from the point
of view of equality of opportunity. 16
Assume that EOP 1 is not satis￿ed for two types with circumstances c and c0. Two situations
can arise. First, for all relative degrees of luck, one type, say c, always gets higher outcome
than the other (∀l,Y (c,l) ≥ Y (c0,l) and the inequality is strict some levels of l). Second, one
type gets higher outcomes for some degrees of luck while the other type gets higher outcomes
for other degrees of luck (for instance, unlucky type- c do better than unlucky type-c0 but lucky
type-c do worse than lucky type-c0). Now consider the hypothetical situation of someone who
would be given the option to choose between circumstances c and c0, without knowing her degree
of luck. This is a typical case of choice under risk. In the ￿rst case, the outcome distribution
associated with c stochastically dominates the one associated with c0 (see below for a de￿nition).
16Empirically, this question seems highly relevant. For instance Dardadoni et al. (2005) and O’Neil et al.(1999)
both test a condition close to EOP 1 and conclude that it is violated. However, they do not o￿er an a formal
ranking criterion for situations in which this condition is violated.
10There is a large agreement among specialists of decision theory (Starmer, 2000) to say that in
this case, consistent preferences under risk, should lead to choose c over c0.17 In the second
case, there is no such unanimous preference for c over c0. The ￿rst situation represents a clear
case of inequality of opportunity while the second corresponds to a weak form of equality of
opportunity, where no set of circumstances yield an unambiguous advantage over the other.
This idea can be formalized using the well-known de￿nition of ￿rst-order stochastic domi-
nance (FSD):
Definition (first order stochastic dominance)
F(.|c) strictly stochastically dominates F(.|c0) at the ￿rst order (F(.|c) FSD F(.|c0)) i￿:
∀y, F(y|c) ≤ F(y|c0) and ∃y | F(y|c) < F(y|c0).
Weak equality of opportunity can be de￿ned as the situation where no type strictly dominates
any other according to FSD.
Definition EOP 2 (weak equality of opportunity)
Equality of opportunity is satis￿ed i￿ : ∀c 6= c0, F(.|c) FSD F(.|c0).
Avoidance of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance is however a very weak requirement to de￿ne
equality of opportunity and one may object that the condition stated in EOP 2 is not restrictive
enough. For instance, it would consider that equality of opportunity prevails between c and c0
in the case where all agents of type c do worse than those of type c0 except for the one with the
highest relative degree of luck. One may provide a more restrictive de￿nition of weak equality
of opportunity by resorting to the criterion of second order stochastic dominance. We discuss
this criterion in the next section, in a welfarist framework.
A welfarist foundation The analysis in Arneson (1989) and Vallentyne (2002) suggests an
alternative way to de￿ne equality of opportunity, in a welfarist framework. They propose to use
the expected value of future prospects as the relevant metric for evaluating opportunities. This
is coherent with the idea that, from an ex ante perspective, given individual circumstances,
luck, and consequently outcomes, may be seen as random processes. In this context, equality
of opportunity can be de￿ned by the equality of the expected value of future prospects across
17This consensus reaches well beyond the Expected Utility Theory. There is also empirical support for that
view. In some experiments (Birnbaum and Navarette, 1998) individual choices may not accord with the ￿rst-
order stochastic dominance criteria. However, as argued by Starmer (2000) this may occur in situations where
stochastic dominance is opaque to the agent. Van de Gaer et al. (2001) also consider consistence with ￿rst-order
stochastic dominance as a desirable property of any measure of equality of opportunity.
11individuals. To perform this, one can use a speci￿c Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
u and compute the expected utility of the opportunities for outcome o￿ered to a given type. In
this case, equality of opportunity is de￿ned by the following proposition :
Definition EOP 3







However, the question of what utility function to choose remains opened. One may of course
resort to a speci￿c utility function, but in this case, the de￿nition of equality of opportunity will
lack generality. Ideally, one would like the characterization of equality of opportunity to hold
for a su￿ciently broad class of utility functions. In the case where there is a natural ordering
for the outcome under consideration, as is the case for income, it is reasonable to focus on
monotone increasing utility functions. In this context, it is obvious that the expected value of
future prospects attached to di￿erent circumstances c will be equal, for all possible increasing
utility functions if and only if the income distributions for these circumstances are equal. Hence,
we get a welfarist foundation to EOP 1.
It is commonly assumed that the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function exhibit risk-
aversion, which corresponds to the case where u() is concave. Under this assumption, in cases
where EOP 1 is not satis￿ed, it is possible to provide a least partial ranking of types than
the one implied by de￿nition EOP 2, by resorting to the criterion of second-order stochastic
dominance (SSD). It is well known 18 that the expected value derived from a distribution F(Y |c)
will be greater than the one derived from F(y|c0) for all increasing concave utility functions if
and only if F(Y |c) stochastically dominates F(y|c0) at the second order, where second-order
stochastic dominance is de￿ned by :
Definition (second-order stochastic dominance)
F(.|c) strictly stochastically dominates F(y|c0) at the second order (F(.|c) SSD F(.|c0))









It is also well-known that SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz dominance, more precisely:
F(.|c)c SSD F(.|c0) ⇐⇒ ∀p ∈ [0,1] GLF(.|c)(p) ≥ GLF(.|c0)(p)
where GLF(.|c)(p) denotes the value at p of the generalized Lorenz curve for the distribution
F (. | c).
18The requirement that choices under risk be consistent with the principle of second-order stochastic dominance
(SSD) stated below does not require that the Von Neumann - Morgenstern axioms be satis￿ed. Machina (1982)
proved that this property is valid under more general conditions within the context of non-expected utility
theories.
12Using these notations, we get the following de￿nition of weak equality of opportunity under
risk aversion:
Definition EOP 4 (weak equality of opportunity under risk aversion)
Equality of opportunity is satis￿ed i￿ : ∀c 6= c0, F(.|c) SSD F(.|c0).
Note that using second-order stochastic dominance leads to a more restrictive de￿nition of
equality of opportunity than the one provided by de￿nition EOP 2.
2.2.2 General model : circumstances, luck and e￿ort
We now develop a general model that takes into account a third determinant of individual
outcomes : e￿ort. Circumstances, denoted by a vector c, consist of the determinants of outcome
that are not seen as a legitimate source of inequality and whose e￿ect on outcome should be
compensated; luck, denoted by a scalar l, comprise those determinants that are seen as a
legitimate source of inequality if it a￿ects outcome in a neutral way; e￿ort, denoted by a scalar
e, includes the determinants that are considered, without any restriction, a legitimate source of
inequality.
In this context, what does equality of opportunity require ? Since inequalities related to
e￿ort are morally acceptable, the requirement of equality of opportunity should only apply
among individuals with similar e￿ort. Hence equality of opportunity requires that individuals
with similar e￿ort face similar prospects for outcome, regardless of their circumstances. This
is equivalent to say that given e￿ort the distribution of outcome should not depend on cir-
cumstances. This criterion extends that of the previous section 19 and can be formalized in the
following de￿nition :
Definition EOP 5
Equality of opportunity is satis￿ed i￿: ∀(c,c0) ∀e, F(.|c,e) = F(.|c0,e).
As already mentioned, the criterion of individual responsibility, put forward by Cohen (1989),
Arneson (1989) and Roemer (1993), o￿ers a moral principle that can serve to de￿ne e￿ort. This
perspective is, however, in no way essential to our analysis. As suggested by the discussion in
section 2.1, alternative principles, such as the principle of self-ownership, may serve to de￿ne
our generic notion of e￿ort. What matters to our analysis is that inequalities originating in
di￿erential e￿ort are seen as legitimate and do not call for compensation. To give another
19This de￿nition also formalizes the discussion in Arneson (1989), where the author suggests that, for equality
of opportunity to hold, expected welfare should be equal across individuals, only to the extent that they exercise
the same degree of responsibility.
13illustration, if we consider that e￿ort is de￿ned by talent and ability, de￿nition EOP 5 leads to
the Rawlsian conception of ￿ fair equality of opportunity ￿, de￿ned as a situation where ￿ those
who are at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them,
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social system ￿
(Rawls, 1971, p.63).
One may wonder whether the condition in EOP 5 is su￿cient to characterize the neutrality
of luck with respect to outcome. The above de￿nition simply requires that, given e￿ort, the
e￿ect of luck be independent of circumstances. As in the previous section, one may further
require that the e￿ect of luck, conditional on relative e￿ort, be constrained to equal a given
distribution that would re￿ect speci￿c a prioris on the equalization of the e￿ect of luck.
It is also possible to formalize a weak notion of equality of opportunity under risk aversion
that extends EOP 4:
Definition EOP 6
Weak Equality of opportunity under risk aversion is satis￿ed i￿:
∀c 6= c0 ∀e, F(.|c,e) SSD F(.|c0,e).
2.3 Empirical identi￿cation
Once circumstances and e￿ort have been de￿ned, it is straightforward to examine whether the
requirements of EOP 5 or EOP 6 are empirically satis￿ed, provided that outcome, circumstances
and e￿ort are observable. However, in many cases, some of that information may be missing.
In this section we discuss to what extent equality of opportunity can be assessed when e￿ort or
circumstances are not fully observable to the empirical analyst.
2.3.1 Unobservability of e￿ort
We ￿rst consider the case where only outcome and circumstances are observable. Hence we only
observe the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances F(y|c) and can only assess
whether EOP 1 or EOP 4 are satis￿ed. However, in the general case, the conditions for equality
of opportunity are stated in terms of the distribution of outcome conditional on circumstances
and e￿ort, F(y|c,e), and not in terms of F(y|c). Letting G() denote the cumulative distribution





14Without additional conditions, EOP 5 will not imply any restriction on the observable
conditional distributions F(y|c). One interesting case arise when the distribution of e￿ort is
independent of c. In this case, it is straightforward to show that EOP 5 implies that the
conditional distributions F(y|c) should be independent of c. Hence EOP 1 is a necessary
condition for EOP 5. This is summarized by the following proposition :
Proposition 1
If ∀c,G(e|c) = G(e) then : EOP 5 =⇒ EOP 1.
Proof : If for all c, G(e|c) = G(e) and if EOP 5 is satis￿ed, then, from equation 1 we get :
F(y|c) =
R
e F(y|e)dG(e). Hence F(.|c) is independent of c and EOP 1 is satis￿ed.
Whether the condition that e￿ort be distributed independently of circumstances is satis￿ed
may at ￿rst appear as an empirical matter. For instance, one may claim that e￿ort should be
de￿ned by some ideal objective measure of how hard someone work. In this case, depending on
the set of circumstances, it may or may not be the case that diligence be distributed indepen-
dently of c. And equality of opportunity consistent with this de￿nition of e￿ort may or may
not be assessed without observation of e￿ort.
One may however object that the case where e￿ort would be correlated to circumstances
re￿ects an inconsistent de￿nition of e￿ort, when e￿ort is restricted to the determinants of
outcome that the individual is considered responsible for. As Roemer argues convincingly, if we
are to take seriously the idea that individuals are not responsible for their circumstances, the
de￿nition of e￿ort needs to be purged of any residual in￿uence of circumstances. This leads to
a relativist conception according to which e￿ort is, by construction, distributed independently
of circumstances. This is the conception put forward by Roemer : " The choice of a degree of
e￿ort (as measured by the percentile of e￿ort levels within a type) as the relevant metric for how
hard a person tried, is justi￿ed by a view that, if we could somehow disembody individuals from
their circumstances, then the distribution of the propensity to exert e￿ort would be the same in
every type".20 This makes it clear that the question of whether e is distributed independently
of c is not solely, nor primarily, an empirical matter related to the identi￿cation of equality
of opportunity under partial observation of the determinants of outcome. It pertains to more
fundamental ethical debates.21 Of course, not everyone would subscribe to the relativist view of
e￿ort. It is far from obvious that Roemer’s argument carries over to the case where e￿ort also
includes non-responsibility factors such as genetic of option luck. If one resort to an ￿absolutist￿
20Roemer (1998, p.15)
21Along similar lines, see the example developed in Cohen (1989, pp917-921).
15view of e￿ort, assessing equality of opportunity requires, in general, that e￿ort be observable. 22
Roemer’s conception of e￿ort can be formalized by a function of some objectively measur-
able e￿ort variable e and circumstances c, e⊥(e,c), such that the distribution of e⊥(e,c) is
independent of c. A natural candidate is e⊥(e,c) = G(e|c), the rank in the distribution of e￿ort
conditional on circumstances c.23 Whether e￿ort should also be purged of the in￿uence of luck
is an opened question that has not been addressed in the normative literature. Two opposite ar-
guments seem relevant from an ethical perspective. On the one hand, luck is beyond individual
responsibility, which suggest that its in￿uence on e￿ort should be nulli￿ed. In this case, e￿ort
would be de￿ned by e⊥⊥ = G(e | c,l). On the other hand, luck di￿ers from circumstances in the
sense that we want to compensate circumstances but not luck, as long as it remains neutral. If
luckier individuals exercise more e￿ort, their higher outcome may be seen as legitimate. In this
case, e￿ort should only be purged of the e￿ect of circumstances. These two points of view lead
to di￿erent conceptions of equality of opportunity. However it is important to emphasize that
they yield similar testable restrictions, in the case where e￿ort is not observable. Consequently,
without loss of generality, we will adopt the second view and de￿ne relative e￿ort as e￿ort net
of the in￿uence of circumstances, i.e. e⊥(e,c) = G(e|c).
The de￿nitions of equality of opportunity given in the previous section are general and do
not rest on a speci￿c view of e￿ort. A de￿nition of equality of opportunity consistent with
the relative view of e￿ort can be obtained by substituting e⊥ for e in the de￿nition of EOP
5 or EOP 6. By construction, if EOP 5 is satis￿ed for e⊥, then, by integration, the outcome
distributions, conditional on circumstances alone, should be equal for all values of c, which is
summarized by the following proposition :
Corollary
For e = e⊥ : EOP 5 =⇒ EOP 1.
Hence EOP 1 is a necessary condition for EOP 5 under the relative view of e￿ort. Note
however, that, as in proposition 2, it is not a su￿cient condition. EOP 5 requires that individuals
with similar e￿ort have similar opportunities. Now consider two values of circumstances c and
c0. Assume that the opportunities o￿ered to low e￿ort type- c individuals are o￿ered to high
e￿ort type-c0 individuals and vice versa. In this case, EOP 1 will be satis￿ed but not EOP 5.
22For instance, equality of opportunity is sometimes de￿ned as the absence of discrimination on irrelevant
characteristics. In the case of labor market discrimination, the relevant e￿ort variable would be some measure of
individual productivity, and there are no reasons to expect it to be distributed independently of circumstances.
For a full discussion of the two notions of e￿ort and there consequences for the assessment of equality of
opportunity, see Lefranc and Trannoy (2006).
23A technical condition is required for e⊥(e,c)) to be properly de￿ned. The distribution of e conditional on c
should not exhibit any mass point.
16We now turn to the assessment of weak equality of opportunity, as de￿ned by EOP 6.
Consistent with the relative view of e￿ort, we assume that e￿ort is independent of circumstances.
The consequences of the unobservability of e￿ort are more serious for asserting EOP 6 than for
EOP 5. In a nutshell, weak equality is de￿ned by some inequalities, conditional on e￿ort and
circumstances, that do not survive well to integration over e￿ort levels. Hence, in general, it is
not possible to assess EOP 6 without observing e￿ort. However, one special case can be singled
out that can be assessed without observing e￿ort. This situation, which we refer to as Strong
inequality of opportunity, is de￿ned by :
Definition SIOP (strong inequality of opportunity)
Strong inequality of opportunity is satis￿ed i￿:
∃(c,c0) such that :
∀e, F(.|c,e) SSD F(.|c0,e)
and
∃e such that F(.|c,e) SSD F(.|c0,e).
In terms of equality of opportunity, SIOP appears as the worst situation, since the oppor-
tunities o￿ered to type c dominate those o￿ered to type c0, whatever the value of e￿ort. This
represents as a particularly strong deviation from EOP 6. EOP 6 states that, whatever the value
of e￿ort, it is never possible to rank the opportunities o￿ered by di￿erent circumstances using
stochastic dominance. On the contrary, SIOP states not only that EOP 6 does not hold but
also requires that the ranking of circumstances be the same for all levels of e￿ort, at least for a
pair of types.24 When e￿ort is independent of circumstances, we have the following proposition
:
Proposition 2
If ∀c,G(e|c) = G(e) then : EOP 4 is a su￿cient condition for the non-occurrence of
SIOP.
Proof : Assume that for all c, G(e|c) = G(e) and that SIOP is satis￿ed. Then, from equation
1 and the de￿nition of second-order stochastic dominance, we get for a pair (c,c
0): F(.|c) SSD
F(.|c
0). Hence EOP 4 is violated.
24Note that the negation of EOP 6 would simply yield : ∃(c,c0) ∃e such that F(.|c,e) SSD F(.|c0,e)
172.3.2 Partial observability of circumstances
We now consider the case where the vector of circumstances is only partially observable. As
before, we also assume that e￿ort is not observable. The vector of observable circumstances is
denoted by c1 and the vector of unobservable circumstances by c2. In this case, it is still possible
to provide a necessary condition for EOP 5 when e￿ort is independent of circumstances. This
is summarized by the following proposition :
Proposition 3
If ∀c,G(e|c) = G(e) then : EOP 5 =⇒ ∀(c1,c0
1), F(.|c1) = F(.|c0
1).
Proof : If EOP 5 is satis￿ed, we have : ∀(c1,c
0
1),∀c2,∀e,∀y, F(y|c1,c2,e) = F(y|c
0
1,c2,e).
Furthermore, if e is distributed independently of circumstances, integrating over values of e
implies : ∀(c1,c
0
1),∀c2, F(.|c1,c2) = F(.|c
0
1,c2)
Integrating over values of c2 implies : ∀(c1,c
0
1), F(.|c1) = F(.|c
0
1).
The reciprocal is however not true. Loosely speaking, proposition 4 simply states that
the values of F(.|c1,c2) and F(.|c0
1,c2) are equal on average, where the average is computed
over values of c2. Of course, this does not imply that the CDF are equal for all values of c2.
Hence, under partial observability of the circumstances, the condition in proposition 4 is only
a necessary condition for equality of opportunity as de￿ned in EOP 5.
Again, assessing EOP 6 is not achievable under partial observability of circumstances. Con-
sider two values c1 and c0
1 of the vector of observable circumstances. Even the case where there is
SIOP between (c1,c2) and (c0
1,c2) for all values of c2 does not imply that F(.|c1) SSD F(.|c0
1),
since c2 need not be distributed independently of observable circumstances. However one special
case of strong inequality of opportunity can be assessed, which corresponds to the case where,
for all possible e￿ort, the set of options o￿ered to individuals with circumstances c1 dominates
the one o￿ered to individuals with circumstances c0
1 whatever the value of their unobservable
circumstances c2. That is :
∀(c2,c0
2),∀e F(.|c1,c2,e) SSD F(.|c0
1,c0
2,e) (SSIOP)
Again, it is possible to provide a su￿cient condition for the non-occurrence of SSIOP, which
is given in the following proposition :
Proposition 4
If ∀c,G(e|c) = G(e) then : EOP 4 is a su￿cient condition for the non-occurrence of
18SSIOP.
Proof : Integrating the condition in SSIOP over e￿ort and unobservable circumstances implies
that F(.|c1) SSD F(.|c
0
1). Hence if e￿ort is independent of circumstances and SSIOP holds,
EOP 4 is violated.
2.3.3 Roemer’s model : circumstances and e￿ort
Roemer’s model appears as a special case of the above setting in which circumstances are
observable, e￿ort is not observable and luck plays no role. 25 Hence outcome can be expressed
as a function Y (c,e⊥) that only depends on e￿ort and circumstances. Since luck plays no role
in this model, EOP 5 implies that individuals with similar e￿ort should receive equal outcomes
regardless of circumstances. This is summarized by the following proposition :
Definition EOP 7 (Roemer’s definition)
Equality of opportunity is satis￿ed in Roemer’s model i￿ :
∀(c,c0),∀e⊥, Y (c,e⊥) = Y (c0,e⊥).
In this case, EOP 1 is of course still a necessary condition for Roemer’s de￿nition EOP 7.
Roemer further assume that the outcome function is strictly increasing in e￿ort. In this case,
although e￿ort is not directly observable, relative e￿ort e⊥ can be inferred from the observation
of outcome and circumstances. For an individual with circumstances c, e⊥ is in fact equal to
the rank p where she sits in the conditional outcome distribution, F(y|c). Since e￿ort can be
inferred, we have the following proposition :
Proposition 5
Under Roemer’s assumptions : EOP 7 ⇐⇒ EOP 1.
Proof : Let Q(p|c) denote the quantile function associated to the distribution F(y|c) and de-
￿ned by p = F(Q(p|c)|c). If outcome is a strictly increasing function of e￿ort, the de￿nition of
e
⊥ implies that Y (c,e
⊥) = Q(e
⊥|c). Hence, we have : EOP 7 ⇐⇒ (∀(c,c
0),∀p ∈ [0,1], Q(p|c) =
Q(p|c
0)) ⇐⇒ EOP 1.
Consequently, under the assumption that outcome is strictly increasing in e￿ort, EOP 1 is
a necessary and su￿cient condition for EOP 7. For similar reasons, EOP 4 is a necessary and
su￿cient condition for avoiding SIOP. These two results require, however, that circumstances
25For a complete discussion of the conditions of identi￿cation of equality of opportunity in Roemer’s model,
see O’Neill, Sweetman and Van De Gaer (1999).
19be fully observable. If they are only partially observable, the results of the previous subsection
apply.
Of course, if, conditional on circumstances, outcome is determined by e￿ort and luck, the
rank in the distribution of outcome conditional on c can no longer serve to identify e￿ort, even
if we assume that outcome is strictly increasing in e￿ort, as the rank re￿ects the joint impact
of luck and e￿ort. This explains why, in the general model, we only have necessary (but not
su￿cient) conditions for EOP 5.
2.3.4 Summary
To summarize the main conclusions of this section, equality of opportunity can be empirically
assessed using the conditions EOP 1 and EOP 4, even in the case where e￿ort is not observable.
To appraise EOP 1, we need to compare the cumulative distributions of income, conditional on
observed circumstances. Since EOP 1 is only a necessary condition for equality of opportunity
in the general model, we can only draw ￿rm conclusions in the case where the cumulative
distributions are not found equal. This case indicates that equality of opportunity, as de￿ned
by EOP 1, EOP 5 or EOP 7, is violated. The situation where the cumulative distributions
are found equal is only indicative of equality of opportunity : we can only conclude to equality
of opportunity if we are willing to consider that the determinants of outcome excluded from
the circumstances only re￿ect luck (which corresponds to the model of section 2.2.1) or e￿ort
(which corresponds to the model of section 2.3.3).
EOP 4 requires to compare the generalized Lorenz curves associated with observed cir-
cumstances. When comparing two generalized Lorenz curves, three situations can occur: (a)
the two curves are identical, (b) the two curves intersect, (c) one curve lies above the other.
Case (a) is equivalent to the equality of the cumulative distributions, which has already been
discussed. Case (b) implies that strong inequality of opportunity, as de￿ned by SIOP, is not
satis￿ed. It also implies that weak equality of opportunity is satis￿ed if we are willing to assume
that the determinants of outcome excluded from the circumstances resort to luck or to e￿ort
alone. Lastly, case (c) is suggestive of a deviation from equality of opportunity for two reasons
: ￿rst, EOP 1 is not satis￿ed; second we cannot even rule out the situation of SIOP. Case (c)
corresponds to the situation of second-order stochastic dominance of one distribution over the
other. A special case of this situation is the case of ￿rst-order stochastic dominance. This case
is worth investigating in its own right, since ￿rst-order stochastic dominance signals a strong
deviation from equality of opportunity, since the opportunity sets o￿ered to individuals with
20di￿erent circumstances can be ranked whatever the attitude of the decision maker towards risk.
3 Empirical application : income in France, 1979-2000
In this section, we analyze equality of opportunities for income in France. To this end, we
examine whether income distributions conditional on social origin are equal or exhibit stochastic
dominance patterns. We ￿rst present the data and the statistical procedure used in the analysis.
We then discuss the results.
3.1 Data
The data come from the French household survey "Budget des Familles" (BdF) conducted by
the French national statistical agency (INSEE). Five waves of the survey have been collected
(1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 and 2000), each on a sample of about 12,000 households. We use all
available waves.26 For each household, the data provide detailed information on all sources
of income and expenditures and enable to identify the household’s social background. Sample
summary statistics are presented in appendix table A-1.
3.1.1 Main variables
All waves of the BdF data contain information on the social origin of heads of household and
their spouse. Both are asked to report the one-digit occupational group of their two parents. 27
From these four variables, it would be possible to build a detailed classi￿cation of social origin.
Given the size of ours samples, the use of a detailed classi￿cation would lead to small sub-
samples, and to inaccurate estimations of the income distributions conditional on social origin.
For this reason, we only use information on the occupational group of the household head’s
to de￿ne individual circumstances. This leads to distinguish the following six social origins:
farmers, artisans, higher-grade professionals, lower-grade professionals, non-manual workers and
manual workers. 28.
The outcome variable we focus on is household standard of living. The BdF data provide a
detailed record of all income sources including wage and labor income, asset income, transfers
26We use sample weight to ensure sample-representativeness.
27For every survey, except 1979, it is the occupational group when the respondent was 16. In 1979, it is the
last occupational group of the parents.
28These six groups correspond to the French INSEE job classi￿cation. Children of artisans also include the
children of small proprietors. The occupational groups of the 1979 survey have been recoded to account for
the change in the occupational classi￿cation that occurred in 1982. We exclude households whose heads report
"student" or "retired" as the main occupation for their father
21(pensions, unemployment bene￿ts, child support, welfare bene￿ts) as well as income and prop-
erty taxes. We consider two measures of family income. The ￿rst one is primary income, which
includes labor and asset income, and unemployment and pension bene￿ts. The second one
corresponds to disposable income and is equal to primary income plus redistributive transfers
minus taxes. In both cases, we normalize family income by family size using the OECD equiv-
alence scale. To make income measures comparable over time, income is expressed in constant
terms (2002 Euros) using the consumer price index.
Consequently, our data set provide a comprehensive measure of one fundamental individual
outcome : living standard. It also o￿er a characterization of an important determinant of
this outcome, that most authors would agree to include among the set of relevant individual
circumstances. On the contrary, it o￿ers no measure of individual e￿ort or luck and may
be criticized for providing only an incomplete description of circumstances. Therefore, the
empirical assessment of equality of opportunity that our data allow corresponds to the situation
analyzed in section 2.3.2.
3.1.2 Sample selection rules
Within a given survey wave, changes in the social structure over time imply that the age
composition will di￿er across groups of di￿erent social origin. For instance, the rise in the
share of higher-grade professionals and the fall in the share of farmers implies that children of
higher-grade professionals (respectively farmers) will be younger (resp. older) than the average.
To avoid this composition e￿ect, our sample is limited to households whose head was between
30 and 50 years old at the time of the survey. We also exclude households whose head was
retired or student at the time of the survey. Another advantage of this sample selection rule is
that household income will be more representative of their lifetime income (Grawe, 2005). This
leads to samples of about 4 000 households in each wave.
The early waves of the survey exhibit a high rate of non-response to the questions pertaining
to income earned and taxes paid. In some case, information is missing for one or several income
items. In others, respondents only report some income items in bracketed form. In these
data, non-response cannot be considered random. It is correlated with the occupation of the
head of household as well as with other socio-demographic characteristics, and is stronger for
self-employed workers (farmers and artisans) than for wage earners. Hence, ignoring missing
data would lead to a biased view of the income prospects conditional on social origin. For
this reason, in case of non-response, household income has been imputed, using the simulated
22residuals method. For observations with missing or bracketed data, we predict income using
an estimated income equation. This equation is estimated on those households who report
an income (in level or in brackets), and income is regressed on observable characteristics (age,
sex, occupational group, last diploma, consumption, nationality, family composition, geographic
area of living ...)29. In case of missing data, we also draw a residual term that is added to the
predicted income. This procedure is implemented to impute primary and disposable income.
The income distribution estimated using this imputation procedure appear consistent with the
distributions obtained from administrative data. This is true, in particular, for farmers’ income
that was especially badly reported in the ￿rst waves of the survey. 30
3.2 Statistical Inference : General principles
Here, we explain the general principles of our statistical methodology. The details of the sto-
chastic dominance tests we implement are presented in the Appendix. Our samples allow to
build income distribution conditional on social origin and tests whether conditions EOP 1 or
EOP 4 are satis￿ed. Assessing equality or stochastic dominance relationships is a demanding
exercise. It requires that the entire outcome distributions (or some integral of them) be com-
pared for all possible circumstances. One should also bear in mind that these distributions need
to be estimated and compared, in our case using samples of relatively small size. Hence, spe-
cial attention must be paid to the statistical robustness of the conclusions drawn from sample
data. In this context, performing parametric tests of stochastic dominance is likely to yield
fragile conclusions. On the contrary, our empirical analysis rests on non-parametric stochastic
dominance tests developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000), which lead to robust conclusions.
The empirical procedure we implement is the following. For all possible pairs of circum-
stances c and c0, we perform three tests independently : (1) we test the null hypothesis of
equality of the distributions of types c and c0; (2) we test the null of ￿rst-order stochastic
dominance of the distribution of type c over type c0 and vice-versa; (3) we test the null of
second-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of type c over type c0 and vice-versa.
Test (1) corresponds to condition EOP 1 and tests (2) and (3) to EOP 4. For any pair of
types, we interpret the joint results of these tests in the way summarized below. Of course, this
29Detailed equations are available upon request.
30As we will discuss, part of the results reported below are driven by changes in the income distribution
of farmers, estimated from our data. Consequently, we were concerned that part of these evolutions may
re￿ect spurious changes in income distribution related to changes in reporting behavior. Hence we compared
the estimated income distribution of farmers to the ones obtained from agricultural national accounts. As
documented in Lefranc et al. (2004), it turns out that our estimates are strongly consistent with those obtained
from administrative sources.
23interpretation is only temptative and one should keep in mind the caveats discussed in section
2.3.4.
• If we fail to reject the null of test (1), we say that equality of opportunity is supported,
since EOP 1 is satis￿ed.
• Else, if test (2) or (3) accepts dominance of one distribution over the other but not the
other way round (e.g. F(|c) SSD F(|c0) and F(|c0) SSD F(|c)) we say that equality of
opportunity is violated, since neither EOP 1 nor EOP 4 are satis￿ed.
• Else, if test (3) rejects dominance of each distribution over the other (( i.e. F(|c) SSD
F(|c0) and F(|c0) SSD F(|c))) we say that weak equality of opportunity is supported,
since EOP 4 is satis￿ed but not EOP 1.
• Else, if test (2) or (3) conclude that the two distributions dominate each other (( i.e.
F(|c) SSD F(|c0) and F(|c0) SSD F(|c))), we give priority to the result of test (1) since
it is a more powerful test of equality of distributions for any signi￿cance level. Hence, we
say that only weak equality of opportunity is supported, since EOP 4 is satis￿ed but not
EOP 1.
Lastly, one should note that, given our interpretation, conclusions of test (2) and (3) cannot
contradict since the null of (2) is included in the null of (3). Thus the conjunction of the results
of the three tests interpreted in this way cannot be inconsistent.
3.3 Results
In this section, we ￿rst report the results of the tests of equality and stochastic dominance, for
the income distributions conditional on our partition of social origin. While we use all available
waves, we only report in the main tables and ￿gures the results for 1979 and 2000, since our
discussion mostly focus on the initial and terminal waves. Results for other years are reported
in the appendix.
Three main conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, equality of opportunity is not
satis￿ed : for most pairwise comparisons of types, we ￿nd evidence of stochastic dominance
relationships; overall, a clear hierarchy of the di￿erent groups of social origin emerges. Second,
the pattern of inequality of opportunity is stable over time : the relative ranking of types remains
almost constant across the period 1979-2000. Third, the degree of inequality of opportunity
decreases over time : while the ranking of types is unchanged, the income distributions of the
di￿erent types come closer together over the period.
24We then examine what factors account for inequality of opportunity. As discussed in decision
theory, two factors may contribute to stochastic dominance between two income lotteries :
di￿erences in the expected return of the two lotteries and di￿erences in the degree of risk of
the two lotteries. In our case, the expected return corresponds to the mean income for each
type and risk corresponds to within type inequality. Our results indicate that the degree of risk
is very similar for all types. This is true over the entire period. On the contrary, the returns
di￿er markedly across types. Since the evolution of these returns is a key determinant of the
narrowing of the income prospect gap, we ￿nally analyze the determinants of the changes in
theses returns over time.
3.3.1 A reduction in the degree of inequality of opportunity
The cumulative distribution functions and the generalized Lorenz curves conditional on social
origin are given in Figures 2 and 3 for 1979 and 2000. For 1979, a particularly clear ranking of
social types emerges. Children of higher-grade professionals stand out as the most advantaged
type : their conditional distribution dominates by far those of other social groups. Children of
lower-grade professionals come next, followed by children of artisans and children of non-manual
workers. In fact, the income distributions of the latter two groups seem very close, especially
in the ￿rst half of the distribution. Lastly, at the bottom of the social hierarchy, come the
children of manual workers and the children of farmers. The income distribution of the children
of farmers, in 1979, is, by far, dominated by all other social backgrounds.
This ￿visual￿ ranking is strongly supported by the results of the tests of equality and sto-
chastic dominance. These results are presented in Table 1, for primary and disposable income.
In 1979, in all but one pair-wise comparisons, the equality of the conditional income distribu-
tions is rejected. Without ambiguity, this indicates that EOP 5 is not satis￿ed. The only two
types who apparently face equal opportunities are the children of non-manual employees and
of artisans, although one should keep in mind, here and in the rest of the paper, that EOP 1
is only a necessary condition for EOP 5. Furthermore in all other pair-wise comparisons, the
tests indicate that one distribution dominates the other, which suggests that strong inequality
of opportunity, as de￿ned by SIOP, may prevail. One should also note that in all these cases,
stochastic dominance is satis￿ed at the ￿rst order, which implies that a ranking of social types
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non-manual workers.
can be achieved without assuming risk aversion. Lastly, in 1979, the impact of taxes and transfer
on inequality of opportunity, is very limited. The gap between the generalized Lorenz curves
is slightly lower for disposable income than for primary income (see ￿gure 3), but stochastic
dominance relationships are not a￿ected by redistribution.
The pattern of stochastic dominance relationships exhibits small changes between 1979 and
2000. The results of the tests for primary income are given in Table 1. Four important features
can be underlined. First, the dominant position of the children of higher-grade professionals re-
mains unchallenged during the entire period: in every wave their income distribution dominates
those of all other groups. Second, the hierarchy of intermediate groups tends to weaken. This
is in great part due to an improvement of the relative ranking of the children of artisans : in
27Table 1: Stochastic dominance tests
A- Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 ? >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
B- Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the income distribution of the groups in row and column using the
tests presented in section 3.2 :
>i: the row dominates the column for order i stochastic dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for order i stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal;
?: the distributions cannot be ranked using ￿rst and second order stochastic dominance.
281979, this type was dominated by children of lower-grade professionals and their opportunities
were equal to those o￿ered to children of non-manual workers; this is no longer the case after
1994. In 2000, the opportunities o￿ered to children of artisans are equal to those o￿ered to
children of lower-grade professionals and dominate those of children of non-manual workers.
In this intermediate group, one can also notice a change in the relative ranking of children of
lower-grade professionals and non-manual workers. In 1989 and 1994, the income distribution
of these two groups are equal, although it is no longer true in 2000. The third important
phenomenon that takes place over this period occurs at the bottom of the hierarchy. In 2000
the conditional distribution of the children of farmers dominates the distribution of children of
manual workers. This group is now dominated by all the others social backgrounds. Overall, a
three-levels hierarchy persists over the entire period. It is dominated by the children of higher
grade professionals. In the middle comes an intermediate group that includes the children of
lower-grade professionals, artisans and non-manual workers. At the bottom, come the children
of farmers and manual workers.
While the ranking of social backgrounds has changed, one may nevertheless be tempted to
conclude that equality of opportunity has not made any good progress over the period 1979-2000.
In all waves, equality of opportunity is rejected in at least 80% of all pair-wise comparisons.
In 2000, EOP 1 is only satis￿ed in one case and EOP 4 prevails in another one. Hence, a
strict ranking of all types is almost always possible. Despite this fact, the comparison of the
generalized Lorenz curves for the ￿rst and the last wave (see ￿gure 3) clearly indicates that
the income distributions of the di￿erent types have come closer together between 1979 and
2000. This suggests that the change at work is more cardinal than ordinal. While inequality of
opportunity continues to prevail, the degree of inequality of opportunity seems to weaken. We
now turn to the analysis of this cardinal change. To do so, we analyze the degree of risk and
the return attached to the di￿erent conditional income distributions.
3.3.2 The risk of social lotteries
As already discussed, stochastic dominance relationships among income lotteries can arise be-
cause of di￿erences in their expected return or in their degree of risk. In the present context,
the expected return is de￿ned as the mean income conditional on social origin and the risk
corresponds to within-type inequalities. Note that in the general model of section 2 the income
lotteries o￿ered to individuals correspond to the income distribution conditional on their cir-
cumstances and e￿ort. Return and risk should be computed from these distributions. In our
29case, we do not observe individual e￿ort. Hence, within-type inequalities will re￿ect the joint
in￿uence of luck and e￿ort.31 This remark should be kept in mind throughout this section.
The degree of risk of the di￿erent social lotteries can be analyzed using the Lorenz curves of
the distributions of income conditional on social origin. Consider two lotteries A and B. The
lottery A is less risky than B if its Lorenz curve is always above the curve of B. In this case,
lottery A is said to Lorenz-dominate lottery B. If the two Lorenz curves are identical then the
two social lotteries are equally risky. Consequently, to compare the degree of risk of the di￿erent
social lotteries, we can resort to the same testing procedure as for stochastic dominance.
Table 2 displays the results of the tests of Lorenz dominance. The Lorenz curves of the
di￿erent social lotteries are very similar. For primary income, tests conclude to the equality of
the Lorenz curves, in 9 comparisons (out of 15) in 1979, 5 in 1984, 12 in 1989, 11 in 1994 and
10 in 2000. The tests conclude to dominance in only one case in 1979, 3 in 1984, 2 in 1994 and
0 in 1989 and 2000. Hence, the di￿erent social lotteries exhibit very similar degrees of risk.
A slightly di￿erent picture emerges from the analysis of the Lorenz curves of disposable
income, for the end of the period. First, in 2000 (as well as in 1994), the Lorenz curve of
the children of manual workers dominates that of all most other groups, with the exception of
the children of non-manual workers and lower-grade professionals. In other words, the income
distribution for children of manual workers exhibits the smallest degree of risk. Second, at the
end of the period, the income distribution of children of farmers and, to a lesser extent, artisans,
tend to exhibit more risk than those of children of wage earners.
Overall, these results suggest that social origin mostly in￿uences the distribution of outcomes
as a scale factor. On the other hand, the combined in￿uence of e￿ort and luck is such that
the relative prospects are roughly similar across types. This implies that income conditional on
social origin can be represented by the following multiplicative model:
yic = E(y | c)i (2)
Where yic represents income of individual i with social origin s, E(y | c) is the income mean
conditional on c and i a random term whose distribution is independent of social origin.
The strong similarity in the degree of risk attached to the di￿erent social backgrounds
explains why in most cases, ￿rst-order stochastic dominance is a su￿cient criterion for ranking
conditional income distributions. 32 In fact, in this context, equality of opportunity can be
31E￿ort can nevertheless be seen as a source of moral hazard and is therefore akin to a form of risk.
32The rare exceptions arise when comparing children of non-wage earners to children of wage earners. Due
to the higher risk in the distribution for the former group at the end of the period, expected return and degree
of risk sometimes point to opposite directions. For instance in 1994, as will be discussed in the next section,
30Table 2: Lorenz dominance tests
A- Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = = <
Artisans - - = ? ? ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = ? ? ? <
Artisans - - = = = ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = =
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
B- Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = < <
Artisans - - = = = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = ? < <
Artisans - - = = = <
H-grade prof. - - - = = <
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the Lorenz curves of the groups in row and column using the criterion
of Lorenz dominance :
>i: the row dominates the column for Lorenz dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for Lorenz dominance;
=: the Lorenz curves are equal;
?: the Lorenz curves cannot be ranked using Lorenz dominance.
31assessed by relying solely on comparisons of mean conditional incomes. This situation is a
priori quite rare. But in this case, the criterion of equality of opportunity suggested by Van de
Gaer (1993) is su￿cient for assessing equality of opportunity.
3.3.3 The expected return of social lotteries
We now compare the expected returns of the di￿erent social lotteries. These expected returns
can be summarized by the mean income conditional on social origin.
Trends in conditional mean income Mean incomes conditional on social origin are given in
Table 3. This table con￿rms the evolution apparent in Figure 3 : mean conditional incomes tend
to converge between 1979 and 2000. The ratio between the mean income of the most advantaged
group (children of higher-grade professionals) and the least advantaged one (children of farmers
in 1979 and of manual workers in 2000) falls from 1.89 to 1.46 for disposable income and from
2.04 to 1.63 for primary income. The advantage of children of higher-grade professionals falls
by one half relative to the least advantaged group and diminishes relative to every other social
background. More generally, the increase in the mean income of the di￿erent social groups is
inversely related to their initial rank.
The increase in mean income is particularly strong for children of non-wage earners: children
of farmers increase their mean income by 34.6%; children of artisans by 8.5%. As a result chil-
dren of non-wage earners improve their relative position relative to all other social backgrounds.
This contributes to the fall in the degree of inequality of opportunity since the initial ranking
of both groups was relatively low : in 1979, children of artisans ranked third and children of
farmers ranked last. The results for non-wage earners should be interpreted with caution due to
the high rate of non-response discussed in section 3.1.2. However, the growth in non-wage earn-
ers mean income reported here is very close to what is observed using non-declarative sources
such as national accounts. Moreover, most of this increase occurs during the 1990’s, a decade
for which we performed very few imputations. Hence, it is most unlikely that the erosion of
higher-grade professionals’ position and the improvement of non-wage earners’ lot documented
here arise from a statistical artifact. They re￿ect important changes in the extent of inequality
of opportunity that need to be analyzed.
the mean disposable income is 5% larger for children of artisans than for children of lower-grade professionals.
However, the stochastic dominance test turns out to be inconclusive due to the higher degree of risk of the
lottery of children of artisans.
32Table 3: Mean income conditional on social origin or destination
A- Mean income conditional on social origin
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 2000 1979 2000
Farmers 12 874 17 541 12 914 17 395
Artisans 19 295 20 174 18 137 19 691
H-grade prof. 26 375 24 543 24 490 23 033
L-grade prof. 21 225 20 511 20 055 19 534
Non-man. workers 17 379 17 720 16 884 17 747
Manual workers 14 612 15 008 14 592 15 709
Mean Income 16 503 18 313 16 070 18 180
B- Mean income conditional on social destination
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 2000 1979 2000
Farmers 9 367 17 858 9 614 17 449
Artisans 17 090 19 833 15 797 18 972
H-grade prof. 28 513 30 642 26 104 27 604
L-grade prof. 19 048 20 185 18 304 19 672
Non-man. workers 14 009 13 327 13 999 14 199
Manual workers 12 264 13 113 12 738 14 357
Mean Income 16 503 18 313 16 070 18 180
Notes : incomes in 2002 Euros. In panel A, the occupational group refers to
social origin; in panel B, to social destination. H-grade prof. : higher-grade
professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers :
non-manual workers.
Decomposition Two factors can explain this fall in the dispersion of mean incomes condi-
tional on social origin. First it may originate from an increase in social mobility : if mobility
increases, conditional mean incomes converge, as the distribution of social class destinations
conditional on social origin come closer together. Second, it may come from a reduction in the
dispersion of mean incomes conditional on social destination. We refer to the ￿rst e￿ect as the
mobility e￿ect, and to the second as the return e￿ect.
As documented in Table 3, mean incomes conditional on social destination tend to partly
converge between 1979 and 2000. Higher-grade professionals experience slower income growth
than other groups and non-wage earners experience faster growth. This indicates that the
return e￿ect contributes to the narrowing of the dispersion of mean incomes conditional on
social origin. However, it only accounts for part of the evolution. The observed reduction in
mean income gaps is much stronger when conditioning on social origin than when conditioning
on social destination. For instance the ratio between the mean disposable income of higher-
grade professionals and manual workers only falls from 2.04 to 1.92. When conditioning on
33Table 4: Occupational group transition matrices
A- 1979
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers Total
Farmers .225 .074 .047 .116 .14 .396 .216
Artisans .009 .234 .192 .219 .147 .195 .139
H-grade prof. .009 .033 .51 .261 .133 .05 .069
L-grade prof. .000 .045 .287 .401 .138 .127 .073
Non-man. workers .006 .057 .144 .295 .197 .298 .111
Manual workers .005 .083 .064 .209 .164 .474 .389
Total .053 .093 .134 .218 .156 .343 1.00
B- 2000
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers Total
Farmers .218 .049 .100 .159 .146 .325 .105
Artisans .004 .118 .205 .251 .191 .229 .122
H-grade prof. .005 .044 .415 .318 .119 .097 .150
L-grade prof. .001 .055 .222 .349 .175 .186 .085
Non-man. workers .007 .056 .137 .275 .232 .290 .184
Manual workers .005 .047 .066 .192 .198 .490 .351
Total .028 .058 .166 .243 .184 .318 1.00
Notes : the table gives the distribution of social destination (in column) conditional on social origin. The rows and columns labelled
‘Total’ give the column (resp. row) marginal distribution. Example: in 2000 sample, 10.5% of the population are children of
farmers, 2.8% are farmers, and 4.9% of the children of farmers are artisans. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade
prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
social origin instead of destination, it falls from 1.67 to 1.46.
The evolution of social mobility is summarized by the mobility matrices given in Table 4.
The matrices indicate a rise in social mobility for several social groups. For example, children of
higher-grade professionals see their probability of becoming higher-grade professionals fall from
51% in 1979 to 44% in 2000, while in the meantime the proportion of higher-grade professionals
in the total population has increased. Children of farmers experience a large increase in upward
mobility : while their probability of becoming farmer remains unchanged, the probability that
they become higher-grade or lower-grade professionals increases between 1979 and 2000 and the
probability that they become manual or non-manual workers decreases. Again, the mobility
e￿ect accounts for part of the change in mean incomes conditional on social origin.
The contribution of the mobility and the return e￿ect to the observed evolution can be
identi￿ed using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 33. The mean income in year t, conditional
on social origin j can be expressed as:
33Oaxaca (1973); Blinder (1973)
34Table 5: Decomposition of the evolution of the mean income
Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Change in mean income (1979-2000)
4481 1 553 -1 457 - 521 863 1 118
First decomposition (in %)
Return e￿ect 83 122 38 -75 121 117
Mobility e￿ect 17 -22 62 175 -21 -17
Second decomposition (in %)
Return e￿ect 85 73 38 -100 118 115
Mobility e￿ect 15 17 62 200 -18 - 15
Notes : Change in mean income in Euros 2002. The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade








where k denotes social destination, αt
jk is the probability of destination k conditional on
origin j and yt
jk denotes the mean conditional on social origin and destination. The change in
mean income conditional on social origin between t and t0 can written as :
∆yj = ∆αj¯ yt
j + ∆¯ yjαt
0
j (3)
∆yj = ∆αj¯ yt
0
j + ∆¯ yjαt
j (4)
where αj and ¯ yj denote the vectors (αj1 ···αjK) and (¯ yj1 ··· ¯ yjK). The ￿rst term on the
right hand-side is the mobility e￿ect; the second is the return e￿ect. As is well-known, the
decomposition is not unique and depends on the choice of the reference period.
The results of the two decompositions for the mean primary incomes are given in Table 5.
For children of farmers, artisans, manual and non-manual workers, the evolution of the mean
conditional income is mostly driven by a positive return e￿ect. For example, the mean income
of farmers has increased by 81.4% during the period 1979-2000, which has been bene￿cial to
the 22% of children of farmers who become farmers themselves. The mobility e￿ect is more
modest and does not a￿ect these groups in similar ways. Children of farmers have bene￿ted
from changes in social mobility. On the contrary, children of non-manual workers experienced a
35fall in the probability to become higher- or lower-grade professionals and tend to lose from the
change in mobility. The same holds true, to a lesser extent, for the children of manual workers.
For children of artisans, the mobility e￿ect is ambiguous and depends on the reference period.
This re￿ects the fact that during the period 1979-2000, this category experienced both a rise
in the probability to become wage-earners and a rise in the wage of artisans relative to wage
earners.
The mobility e￿ect has a stronger impact on the evolution of the mean income of children
of higher-grade and lower-grade professionals. The latter group mostly loses as a result of the
evolution of social mobility : their probability of becoming higher or lower grade professionals
decreases over time. This is partly compensated by the return e￿ect. On the contrary, both
e￿ects contribute to the fall of the advantage of children of higher-grade professionals, although
the contribution of the mobility e￿ect is larger.
In summary, the mobility e￿ect mostly contributed to the fall of the advantage of the higher
ranking types, while the improvement of the lot of lower ranking types mostly stems from the
return e￿ect.
4 Conclusion
While di￿erent ethical positions can be defended, regarding how to substantively de￿ne equality
of opportunity, our analysis indicates that any de￿nition relies on a partition of the determinants
of individual outcomes into three distinct groups : e￿ort, which includes the determinants that
are seen as a legitimate source of outcome di￿erences; circumstances, which consist of the
determinants that should not lead, other things equal, to di￿erences in outcome; luck, which
comprises the determinants that are seen as a fair source of inequality provided that they are
even-handed, with respect to circumstances. In this perspective, the generic model of equality
of opportunity developed in this paper appears as a general model, that can encompass a
variety of speci￿c conceptions of equality of opportunity, depending on the precise empirical
characterization of the above three sets of factors. This model also makes clear that, once
these di￿erent sets have been delineated, there may still be several ways to de￿ne equality of
opportunity, which correspond to the strong and weak criteria introduced here.
Whatever the precise conception adopted, empirically assessing equality of opportunity turns
out to be a data-demanding exercise. To many, equality of opportunity appears as a more desir-
able social objective than equality of outcome because it takes into account the determinants of
observed outcomes. The obvious drawback of this alternative conception is that making equality
36of opportunity judgments ideally requires that all the relevant determinants of outcome be ob-
servable. Of course, this condition will rarely be met and assessing equality of opportunity will
most likely take place under conditions of imperfect information on the relevant determinants.
In this paper, we exhibit two testable conditions of equality of opportunity that can be used in
this context. One is a necessary condition for the strong form of equality of opportunity. The
other is a su￿cient condition for the weak form. Only in very restrictive cases is it possible to
exhibit a necessary and su￿cient condition. Hence, in almost all cases, imperfect information
implies that equality of opportunity cannot be fully assessed. This is probably the price to pay
if we are willing to develop a rich enough view. It is also important to emphasize that these two
conditions still allow, in our empirical application, to provide a valuable assessment of equality
of opportunity in France. Even with limited information on the determinants of outcomes,
these conditions indicate that equality of opportunity is clearly violated. This conclusion would
therefore remained unchanged if we had access to a richer data set.
On the empirical side, this paper reveals that social inheritance is a deeply rooted source
of inequality in France over the period 1979-2000. Di￿erences in social origin translate into
signi￿cant gaps of living conditions. Equality of opportunity in income acquisition does not
prevail, neither for primary income nor for disposable income. However, the degree of inequal-
ity of opportunity tends to decrease. During this period, the average gap between the most
advantaged social group, the children of higher-grade professionals, and the least advantaged
one fall by one half.34 The explanation of this evolution is addressed in a companion paper
(Lefranc et al. (2006)). We show that this reduction in inequality of opportunity does not arise
from a decrease in the degree of transmission of economic advantage from one generation to the
next. Over time, children tend to face more equal opportunities because of a fall in inequality
of outcomes among their parents.
Lastly, this paper has underlined an important phenomenon: the risk of social lotteries
appears very similar across the di￿erent groups of social origin. As a ￿rst approximation, the
in￿uence of social origin on opportunities for income, in France, can be summarized by a scale
factor : individual income is determined by the product of a random variable - distributed
independently of social origin- and the mean income conditional on social origin. Whether a
similar determination of income opportunities is also at work in other countries is a question that
would be worth investigating. Future research should also analyze the theoretical explanation
and consequences of this important stylized fact.
34This conclusion con￿rms those of Vallet (2004) who notices a slight increase in social mobility in France.
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Stochastic dominance relationships can be easily expressed and statistically tested by making






For example D1(z) is the proportion of people whose income is below z; D2(z) measures for
the mean poverty gap, i.e. the mean amount that should be given to people below the poverty
line z, to reach this threshold.
The link between poverty indices and stochastic dominance has been established by Foster
and Shorrocks (1988). They have shown that stochastic dominance at the order g of distribution
FA over FB is equivalent to the situation where the poverty index of order g for FA is smaller
than the poverty index for FB, for all poverty lines. Letting SDg denote stochastic dominance
at the order g, we have, for g ∈ IN+ :





Consequently, tests of stochastic dominance are equivalent to test of inequality for poverty
indices. The procedure adopted here follows Davidson and Duclos (2000) and consists in testing
such inequalities for a ￿xed number, k, of poverty lines. The poverty lines used here are the
deciles and 95th percentile of the overall household income distribution. 35
For a given poverty line z, an unbiased and asymptotically normal estimator for the poverty






(z − xi)g−1I(xi ≤ z)
where i denotes the ith observation, N denotes the sample size and I(·) is an indicator function
equal to 1 when its argument is true, 0 otherwise. For some ￿xed set of poverty lines { z1,...,zk},
let ˆ Dg denote the vector of poverty indices ( ˆ Dg(z1)... ˆ Dg(zk)) and Σ its asymptotic variance-
covariance matrix37.
The hypothesis of dominance at the order g between two distributions FA and FB can be




A) the di￿erence of the vectors of poverty
indices. Stochastic dominance at the order g can be test as : H0 : δ ∈ IR
k
+ versus H1 :δ / ∈ IR
k
+.
The test statistic is constructed from the estimated vector ˆ δ =(ˆ D
g
B − ˆ D
g
A), whose asymptotic




NB under the hypothesis of independence between
distributions A and B.
The null hypothesis is de￿ned by a set of k constraints. Two approaches can be followed
to conduct this test. The ￿rst consist in testing each of the k constraints separately. The
intersection of k sub-hypothesis is tested in each point where the distributions are compared.
This kind of test, called "intersection-union", is used for example in Bishop et al. (1992).
However, Dardanoni et Forcina (1999) and Davidson and Duclos (2000) have demonstrated
that this test procedure has relatively low power, since it ignores the covariance structure of
the vector ˆ δ. The second approach, that will be followed here, amounts to simultaneously test
the k constraints, using a Wald test and explicitly taking into account the covariance structure
of the estimated poverty indices di￿erences vector. The general principle of the test amounts
to compare the distances between the estimated vector ˆ δ to the sets de￿ning respectively the
35In order to use non-stochastic poverty lines, these percentiles are computed from administrative tax records
(the Revenus Fiscaux data) that are independent of the BDF survey.
36In our application this formula has been adapted to account for sample weights.
37See Davidson and Duclos (2000), theorem 1. p.1441 for the expression of this matrix.
41null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. Of course, Wald tests can also be used to test
the equality of two distributions.
Equality tests The Wald test for the equality of two distributions is relatively easy to im-
plement and resort to a χ2 test. The null hypothesis is given by H0 : δ = 0. One can show
(Beach and Davidson, 1983; Davidson and Duclos, 2000) that under the null hypothesis, the
vector ˆ δ is asymptotically normal and we have :







Hence the test statistic T1 has the following asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis:








)−1ˆ δ ∼ χ2
k
Stochastic dominance tests Stochastic dominance tests are more complex to implement
since in this case, the set corresponding to the null hypothesis is de￿ned by an inequality
constraint. The hypothesis are given by: H0 : δ ∈ IR
k
+ against H1 :δ / ∈ IR
k
+. The Wald test
statistic with such constraints has been developed by Kodde and Palm (1986) and Wolak (1989).




||ˆ δ − δ||
with ||x|| = x0Σ−1x. Kodde and Palm (1986) have shown that the statistic T2 is distributed
as a mixture of χ2 distributions:
T2 ∼ χ2 = Σk
j=0w(k,k − j,Σ)Pr(χ2
j ≥ c)
with w(k,k − j,Σ) the probability that k − j elements of δ are strictly positive. The
distribution of the χ2 distribution have not been tabulated, but lower and upper bounds of
critical values are available. When these bounds do not allow to reach a conclusion we estimate
the critical values of the statistic T2 using Monte-Carlo simulation38.
38We draw 10.000 multivariate normal vectors with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ, and compute the propor-
tion of vectors with j positive elements (for j ∈ (0,k)). This proportion is an estimate of the weight w(k,j,Σ).
42B- Summary statistics and results for intermediate waves
Table A-1: Sample summary statistics
1979 1984 1989 1994 2000
Occupation of the father (%)
Farmers 21.65 18.23 15.69 12.95 10.55
Artisans 13.93 11.29 12.13 13.61 12.26
H-grade prof. 6.95 6.97 7.92 15.25 15.05
L-grade prof. 7.37 9.63 11.45 8.13 8.52
Non-man. workers 11.18 14.03 12.2 16.28 18.49
Manual workers 38.92 39.85 40.6 33.79 35.13
Obs Imputed 377 233 158 149 0
Mean Income
before imputation 16182 16428 17071 18276 18180
after imputation 16070 16590 17161 18178 18180
Obs 4231 4428 3529 4644 3984
Notes : mean income in Euros 2002. H-grade prof. : higher-grade
professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man.
workers : non-manual workers.
43Table A-2: Stochastic dominance tests - Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 = = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - = >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 ?
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - = >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 ? >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the income distribution of the groups in row and column using the
tests presented in section 3.2 :
>i: the row dominates the column for order i stochastic dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for order i stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal;
?: the distributions cannot be ranked using ￿rst and second order stochastic dominance.
44Table A-3: Stochastic dominance tests - Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 = >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 <1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Artisans - - <1 <1 ? >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 >1
Artisans - - <1 ? >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - = >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - <1 <1 <1 <1 >1
Artisans - - <1 = >1 >1
H-grade prof. - - - >1 >1 >1
L-grade prof. - - - - >1 >1
Non-man. workers - - - - - >1
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the income distribution of the groups in row and column using the
tests presented in section 3.2 :
>i: the row dominates the column for order i stochastic dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for order i stochastic dominance;
=: the distributions are equal;
?: the distributions cannot be ranked using ￿rst and second order stochastic dominance.
45Table A-4: Mean income conditional on social origin and destination
A- Mean income conditional on social origin
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 1984 1989 1994 2000 1979 1984 1989 1994 2000
Farmers 12 874 14 079 14 058 16 839 17 541 12 914 14 018 14 219 16 728 17 395
Artisans 19 295 17 846 19 199 21 328 20 174 18 137 16 814 18 464 20 214 19 691
H-grade prof. 26 375 26 126 26 435 25 038 24 543 24 490 23 694 23 975 22 946 23 033
L-grade prof. 21 225 21 752 20 688 20 122 20 511 20 055 20 292 19 748 19 156 19 534
Non-man. workers 17 379 18 195 19 753 18 633 17 720 16 884 17 486 18 970 18 053 17 747
Manual workers 14 612 15 320 15 440 15 406 15 008 14 592 15 252 15 305 15 588 15 709
Mean Income 16 503 17 154 17 676 18 774 18 313 16 070 16 590 17 161 18 178 18 180
B- Mean income conditional on social destination
Primary Income Disposable Income
1979 1984 1989 1994 2000 1979 1984 1989 1994 2000
Farmers 9 367 8 939 9 765 13 377 17 858 9 614 9 221 10 221 13 571 17 449
Artisans 17 090 14 545 19 853 21 432 19 833 15 797 13 584 18 229 19 801 18 972
H-grade prof. 28 513 29 492 29 868 31 423 30 642 26 104 26 410 26 952 28 198 27 604
L-grade prof. 19 048 19 961 20 247 19 890 20 185 18 304 18 959 19 285 19 077 19 672
Non-man. workers 14 009 14 680 14 054 14 008 13 327 13 999 14 620 14 198 14 354 14 199
Manual workers 12 264 12 548 12 673 12 975 13 113 12 738 13 141 13 364 13 752 14 357
Mean Income 16 503 17 154 17 676 18 774 18 313 16 070 16 590 17 161 18 178 18 180
Notes : income in 2002 Euros. In panel A, the occupational group refers to social origin; in panel B, to social destination. H-grade
prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals. Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
46Table A-5: Lorenz dominance tests - Primary Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = = <
Artisans - - = ? ? ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = ? < < <
Artisans - - = ? = =
H-grade prof. - - - ? ? ?
L-grade prof. - - - - ? ?
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = ? = = ?
Artisans - - = = = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = = = =
Artisans - - = < = <
H-grade prof. - - - = ? ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = ? ? ? <
Artisans - - = = = ?
H-grade prof. - - - = = =
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the Lorenz curves of the groups in row and column using the criterion
of Lorenz dominance :
>i: the row dominates the column for Lorenz dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for Lorenz dominance;
=: the Lorenz curves are equal;
?: the Lorenz curves cannot be ranked using Lorenz dominance.
47Table A-6: Lorenz dominance tests - Disposable Income
1979 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - ? = = < <
Artisans - - = = = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1984 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = < < <
Artisans - - = ? = =
H-grade prof. - - - = = =
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
1989 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = = ? <
Artisans - - = = ? ?
H-grade prof. - - - = ? ?
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - ?
1994 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = < < <
Artisans - - = < < <
H-grade prof. - - - ? < <
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
2000 Farmers Artisans H-grade prof. L-grade prof. Non-man. workers Manual workers
Farmers - = = ? < <
Artisans - - = = = <
H-grade prof. - - - = = <
L-grade prof. - - - - = =
Non-man. workers - - - - - =
Notes : The occupational group refers to social origin. H-grade prof. : higher-grade professionals. L-grade prof. : lower-grade professionals.
Non-man. workers : non-manual workers.
Each element in the table indicates the result of the comparison of the Lorenz curves of the groups in row and column using the criterion
of Lorenz dominance :
>i: the row dominates the column for Lorenz dominance ;
<i: the column dominates the row for Lorenz dominance;
=: the Lorenz curves are equal;
?: the Lorenz curves cannot be ranked using Lorenz dominance.
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